We next consider the Department’s demurrer to Challengers’ claim that Act 117, with respect to DSS Providers, is a standardless delegation of legislative authority and, therefore, violates article II, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides that “[t]he legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly.” Pa. Const. art. II, § 1. Article II, section 1 embodies the fundamental concept that only the General Assembly may make laws, and “cannot constitutionally delegate the power to make law to any other branch of government or to any other body or authority.” Blackwell v. State Ethics Commission, 523 Pa. 347, 359-60, 567 A.2d 630, 636 (1989).

While the General Assembly may “delegate authority and discretion in connection with the execution and administration of a law,” to do so, it must “establish primary standards and impose upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy in accordance with the general provisions of the enabling legislation.” Id. In Gilligan v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Commission, 492 Pa. 92, 422 A.2d 487 (1980), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the “principal limitations” on the General Assembly’s power to delegate such authority “are twofold: (1) the basic policy choices must be made by the Legislature; and (2) the ‘legislation must contain adequate standards which will guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative functions.’” Id. at 96, 422 A.2d at 489 (citations omitted) (quoting Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. County Board of School Directors of Allegheny County, 418 Pa. 520, 529, 211 A.2d 487, 493 (1965)).